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Separating Resource Rents from
Intra-marginal Rents in Fisheries’
Economic Survey Data
Louisa Coglan and Sean Pascoe
Economic surveys of fisheries are undertaken in several conntnes as a means of assessing the
economic performance of their fisheries. The level of economic profits accruing in the fishery
can be estimated from the average economic profits of the boats surveyed. Economic profits
consist of two components—resource rent and intra-marginal rent. From a fisheries
management perspective, the key indicator of performance is the level of resource rent being
generated in the fishery. Consequently, these different components need to be separated out.
In this paper, a means of separating out the rent components is identified for a heterogeneous
fishery, This is applied to the multi-purpose fleet operating in the English Channel. The paper
demonstrates that failing to separate out these two components may result in a
misrepresentation of the economic performance of the fishery.
The purpose in managing fisheries is to ensure that
the resource is exploited in an optimal fashion.
Optimal exploitation is generally defined in the
context of various economic, social and biological
(conservation) criteria, the relative weighings of
which varies from country to country. For ex-
ample, in the U.S,, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (Public Law
94-265) specifies that fisheries managers shall aim
to achieve the ‘optimum yield’ from each fishery.
The Act specifies a number of national standards
against which fisheries management must be as-
sessed and requires that regional management
councils monitor the performance of each fishery
under their control with respect to these standards. 1
Similarly the Australian Fisheries Act (1994) re-
quires annual assessment of the biological and eco-
nomic status of Commonwealth managed fisheries.
In Europe, the Scientific, Technical and Economic
Committee for Fisheries (STECF) is similarly
charged with assessing the biological and eco-
nomic status of European fisheries.
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Biologists have developed a series of reference
points against which the biological status of the
resource can be assessed (Mace 1994). These in-
volve an assessment of the status of each stock for
the fishery as a whole. The key indicator of eco-
nomic performance is the level of resource rent
generated in the fishery. Effectively managed,
most fisheries are capable of earning substantial
levels of resource rent (Arnason 1993). Resource
rent is the return to the owner of the resource, For
example, land rent is the return to the owner of the
land representing the value of the land in the pro-
duction process. The price of land reflects the capi-
talized value of all future rents in a perfect market.
In fisheries, resource rent is the return to the owner
of the fishery resource, and represents the value of
the input generated by the fish stock in the produc-
tion process.
In an unregulated fishery, resource rent is dissi-
pated through excessive levels of effort being ap-
plied to the stock (Gordon 1954). Hence, resource
rent can only be realized through fisheries man-
agement and for this reason is sometimes called
management rent (Anderson 1989).2 Conse-
quently, the measurement of rent is important in
terms of measuring the effectiveness of manage-
ment.
2 In this paper, the term resourm rent and management rent (or returns
to management) are assumed synonymous. However, the term resource
rent is used in the analysis.220 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
In practice, assessment of the economic perfor-
mance of fisheries is derived from economic sur-
veys of the individual fishers participating in the
fishery. Regular surveys of economic performance
are undertaken in Australia (e.g. ABARE 1998)
and most European countries (e.g. Concerted Ac-
tion 1998; Nautilus Consultants 1998; SJFI 1998;
Smit and others 1998) in order to meet the moni-
toring requirements of their respective fisheries
policies. Similar economic data will need to be
collected in the U.S. either through surveys or
other methods, under Section 404 of the Magnu-
son-Stevens Act which specifies the areas of re-
search to be undertaken in support of the monitor-
ing requirements of the Act.
However, average values derived from surveys
of commercial fishers may be misleading indica-
tors of economic rent in the fishery. A fishery is
generally thought to be generating resource rent if
the average economic returns to capital in the fish-
ery are greater than normal economic returns.
However, in a heterogeneous fleet, above normal
profits of individual boats may arise through more
efficient practice of the fisher rather than effective
management by fisheries authorities. Even in the
absence of fisheries management, boats with more
highly skilled crew or skipper could be earning
above normal profits.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the use of
average performance measures will be misleading
in fisheries with heterogeneous fleets. However,
data collected in economic surveys can be used to
separate the economic profits into resource rent
and intra-marginal rent at the fishery level. This is
examined in both a theoretical context and with
reference to a heterogeneous multi-purpose fleet—
the UK fishing fleet operating in the English Chan-
nel. This fleet has similar characteristics to those
found in other multispecies fisheries (for example
the Australian South East fishery and the New En-
gland groundfish fishery 3). Hence, the method de-
veloped will be applicable to a wide variety of
fisheries.
Resource Rent and Average Costs of Effort
The traditional economic model of a fishery (Gor-
don 1954) is based on the assumption of a com-
petitive homogeneous fleet that has a common cost
structure (i.e. the average cost per unit of effort is
3For general descriptions of these fisheries see Pascoe, Robinson and
CogIan (1997) for the English Channel fishery, Pascoe (1993) for the








Figure 1. The Traditional Bioeconomic
Model.
the same for all boats), Fishers maximize their in-
dividual profits based on the costs of the purchased
inputs, [t is assumed that fisher costs include an
allowance for their own labor input and for normal
profits representing the opportunity cost of the in-
vestment. However, the input generated by the fish
stock has essentially a zero cost in the fishing pro-
cess.
In a free and open access fishery where property
rights are not defined, the existence of any positive
economic profits (i.e. super normal profits) is as-
sumed to attract new entrants to the industry, re-
ducing the industry average revenue until all boats
are earning zero economic profits (i.e. normal prof-
its), the point of open access equilibrium (OAE). In
figure 1, the level of effort (a measure of the total
inputs used by the fleet) at this equilibrium is de-
noted as EoA~. At this equilibrium, there are only
normal returns being earned by the factors of pro-
duction owned by the fisher (i.e. capital and labor).
Since the fish input does not have an explicit cost,
the potential return to the resource is dissipated.
The economic objective of management is to
generate a return to the resource. This is achieved
by reducing effort to a point below that of the OAE
and ideally to the point that produces the greatest
economic profits, or the maximum economic yield
(MEY) (figure 1). As the factors of production
owned by the fisher are earning normal returns, the
economic profits in the traditional model represent
the returns to the stock input (i.e. the resource
rent). Hence, the level of economic profits of the
fleet is an indicator of the performance of manage-
ment in generating economic benefits from the
fishery, given that the assumptions of the model
are satisfied.
An implication arising from the traditional
model is that average performance indicators are
an appropriate description of the fishery since the
average boat describes the marginal boat. Conse-
quently, the economic performance of the average
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Figure 2. Heterogeneous Fishing Fleet in an Unregulated Fishery.
all boats. A survey indicating above normal pro-
fits on an average per boat basis would therefore
indicate the existence of resource rent in the
fishery.
Heterogeneity in cost structure (arising through
differences in size, age, engine power and the skill
of the skipper and crew) has implications for the
definition of the level of rent in the fishery. In an
unregulated fishery, an individual boat may be
earning above normal profits accrued through ef-
ficiency gains, breaking even or be making an eco-
nomic loss. Consequently any description of eco-
nomic performance of the average boat will be the
mean value of the entire distribution of the returns
to all boats in the fishery. Hence, the average boat
no longer equates to the marginal boat (Anderson
1989).
This is illustrated in figure 2 for the open access
fishery with a heterogeneous fleet consisting of n
boats. Given that the industry is competitive and
that the individual boats cannot influence the price
received, all boats face the same marginal revenue
curves (equivalent to the industry average rev-
enue). An individual boat’s returns are maximized
at the level of effort where its marginal costs
equals its marginal revenue. Heterogeneity of the
fleet is exhibited through the different cost struc-
tures facing each boat. At any one point in time (as
would be observed from a sample survey), it would
be expected that the fishery would be in disequi-
librium rather than equilibrium, with some boats
making economic profits while others make eco-
nomic losses.
As some boats are likely to be making a loss in
any one year in an unregulated fishery, the industry
level of effort is likely to be greater than the theo-
retical open access equilibrium level of effort with
a heterogeneous fleet, The latter level of effort is
defined by the intersection of the industry marginal
cost curve with the average revenue curve (Han-
nesson 1993). In figure 2, the total fishing effort is
E& which is greater than the OAE level. Boat 1 is
earning economic profits, boat m is earning normal
returns and boat n (the least profitable boat) is
earning an economic loss, Firms (boats) that made
economic losses (e.g. boat n) are termed extra-
marginal while those that earn economic profits
(e.g. boat 1) are intra-marginal. The corresponding
losses/profits may also be defined respectively as
extra-marginal rent and intra marginal rents (Call
and Holahan 1983). Provided that m – 1 > n – m
(i.e. more boats are intra-marginal than extra-
marginal), the average economic profit of the boats
would be positive,
In the long run, the expectation from economic
theory would be for boat n to exit the fishery.
However, in practice, the above normal profits
being earned by boat 1 would attract ad-
ditional boats to the fishery, potentially forcing
currently profitable boats to become unprofitable
(i.e. extra-marginal) (Whitmarsh 1998). As a re-
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Figure 3. The Effects of Management on Economic Profits.
exist in an unregulated fishery with a heteroge-
neous fleet.
The model has further consequences for the at-
tributes of an unregulated fishery with a heteroge-
neous fleet. Under the traditional model, open ac-
cess equilibrium occurs when no resource rent ex-
ists in the fishery. However, as seen in figure 2, the
marginal cost exceeds the average revenue at the
total level of effort in the fishery (a consequence of
some boats making a 10SS).4As a result, an open
access fishery may be characterized by negative
resource rents rather than zero resource rents.
The introduction of management into a fishery
can (but will not always) reduce the level of effort
below the open access level. For example, in figure
3, fisheries management has been assumed to have
reduced effort below the open access equilibrium
level through the removaI of x boats. In addition, it
is also assumed that new boats have been pre-
vented entry to the fishery, for example through
some license limitation scheme. The reduction in
total fishery effort results in the average revenue
4For the sake of illustration, the iudustry level of effort in figure 2 is
assumed to be at the point where average revenue equals average cost.
This is not based on any theoretical reasoning, except that the existence
of busts making a loss in a fishery would necessitate the marginal cost
being greater than the average revenue in tbe fishery. Any effort level to
the right of the open access equilibrium level (where average revenue
equals marginal cost) would have been suitable to demonstrate this.
Derived from Anderson (1989)
increasing from r to r’. The remaining n - x boats
are again operating at the point where their mar-
ginal revenue (equal to the fishery average rev-
enue) equals their marginal cost. As average rev-
enue has increased, each boat increases individual
effort. However, under this example, each boat is
earning economic profits. The least profitable boat
(boat n – x) would have earned zero economic
profits when MR = r, but is earning positive eco-
nomic profits given MR = r’ (as indicated by the
darker shaded area). The other boats are also earn-
ing above normal profits. However this consists of
both resource rent and intra-marginal rent,5 with
the latter being the economic profits over and
above the marginal (or least profitable) boat, while
the resource rent represents the economic profits of
the least profitable boat that arose out of the man-
agement change.
From the above, positive economic profits in
heterogeneous fisheries can be considered as con-
sisting of two elements—resource rent and intra-
marginal rent. The disaggregation of the above
5In the absence of management, this would be considered only as
irrtra-marginal rent. However, as a result of management, part of the
intm-margimd rent becomes resource (or management) rent. This has
implications fur extracting resource rent as in some cases, extracting the
full rent may make some efficient producers worse off under marrage-
ment than under open access (Anderson 1989). This, however, is a sepa-
rate issue.Coglan and Pascoe Separating Resource Rents from Intra-marginal Rents 223
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Effects of Management on Resource Rent.
normal profit into the rent components is depen-
dent upon the level of economic profits (if any)
generated by the marginal boat. Given that above
normal profits can exist in an unmanaged fishery
through technical externalities, positive resource
rent can only be identified when even the least
profitable boat is earning above normal profit.
However, identifying the marginal boat in a fishery
can be problematic. Nevertheless, an estimate of
the level of resource rent in the fishery as a whole
can be derived from information collected in a sur-
vey.
At the fishery level, the resource rent can be
estimated as the difference between total fishery
economic profits and the total level of intra mar-
ginal rent. In figure 4, three management scenarios
are presented. Each assumes that management has
been successful in reducing effort below the open
access disequilibrium level. In figure 4a, total fish-
ery profits are positive and defined by the area
abed. The level of intra-marginal rent is given by
the area ab*e. As the intra-marginal rents are
greater than the total economic profits, the level of
resource rent in the fishery is negative, and is
equivalent to the area b*bf. In this case, however,
the level of resource rent is still greater than in the
unregulated fishery (figure 2) in that the loss is not
as large. In figure 4b, the level of economic profits
is equal to the total intra-marginal rent in the fish-
ery. As a result, the level of resource rent in the
fishery is zero. This is equivalent to the theoretical
open access equilibrium, which ironically may not
be achievable without management. The third ex-
ample, figure 4c, illustrates the potential for posi-
tive resource rents to be achieved through effort
reduction. In this case, total fishery profits are
given by abed, while intra marginal rents are given
by a*b*e. Total resource rent is given by abb*a*.
Resource Rent in Multi-species
Multi-purpose Fisheries
Most theoretical models of resource rent relate to
the single species, single gear type fishery. How-
ever, many fisheries are characterized by multi-
gear boats targeting a variety of fish species, Such
multi-purpose fishers will allocate their effort224 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
across the range of available activities (and hence
across a range of species) such that the marginal
profitability from each activity is equal (Anderson
1982). Each boat will change its marginal activity
to exploit any price advantage of a particular spe-
cies resulting in opportunistic targeting behavior.
In such a case, the boundaries of the fishery are
less clearly defined, and therefore it is important to
look at all interacting components. The level of
resource rent being generated in the fishery is thus
less related to the individual species or activity, but
to the overall profitability of the boats which may
undertake a number of different activities over the
year and target a number of different species.
Identifying and comparing individual cost
curves in such a case is difficult as both the cost
structure and the output mix may vary from boat to
boat. Hence, the graphical representation of the
conditions for identifying resource rent outlined
above are not directly applicable to a multi-
purpose fleet operating in a multi-species fishery.
Nevertheless, the general principles outline above
are applicable to a multi-purpose fleet. That is,
given boats are able to modify their fishing activity
to maximize their individual profitability, resource
rents can only exist in a multi-purpose fleet if all
boats are earning economic profits.
Estimating Resource Rent from Survey Data
Economic surveys of fisheries are generally con-
ducted in order to determine the mean economic
performance of fishing boats. From these, conclu-
sions are often drawn regarding the level of eco-
nomic rent and the performance of fisheries man-
agement. However, as can be seen from figures 2
and 3, the average of the boat profits in both ex-
amples would indicate an above normal return, but
resource rents are only being accrued in the second
example (figure 3). Hence, survey estimates may
provide misleading information as to the existence
and/or magnitude of resource rents. Even in a regu-
lated fishery, economic profits observed in a fleet
may be indicative of intra-marginal rent alone
rather than resource rent. This problem with use of
survey estimates was evident in the survey of the
English Channel fishing fleet.
The English Channel Fishery
The English Channel is exploited commercially by
fishers from several European states although the
majority of the catch in the Channel is taken by
French and UK fishers. Some 4,000 boats in total
operate in the fishery annually of which about
2,200 are from the UK. These boats use a number
of different types of gear (e.g. trawl, nets, lines and
pots) and catch a range of species, resulting in a
substantial number of technical interactions in the
fishery. In addition, many of the boats are multi-
purpose. Most boats carry more than one gear type,
with the fishers switching gear during the year in
response to environmental and economic condi-
tions (e.g. prices and relative costs of harvest). In
some cases. fishers used four or more different
gear types over the year. As a result, the Channel
fleet needs to be considered as one large multi-
purpose fleet rather than a number of separate
fleets geographically co-located.
The fishery is managed through a combination
of output controls (total allowable catches of major
species set by the European Commission) and in-
put controls (for example, mesh size restrictions,
unitization and license limitations set by national
and regional management authorities), In addition,
a decommissioning scheme and unit forfeiture pro-
gram on boat replacement is in place in an attempt
to reduce the overall fleet size and capacity oper-
ating in the fishery. The latter measures have been
in place in the fishery since the mid- 1980s and
have reduced the overall fleet size during this pe-
riod.
An economic survey of UK fishers along the
English Channel was conducted during late 1995
and over the first half of 1996. A stratified sample
of boats was selected based on their home port,
size class and engine power. The distribution of the
sample was based on both boat numbers in each
strata and estimated value of production by each
strata. In total, information on 77 boats was col-
lected. Observations were weighted on the basis of
the total number of boats within each strata and the
number of boats surveyed in each strata. Further
details on the sample methodology and non-
response are given in Pascoe, Robinson and
Coglan (1997).
Average Economic Performance Indicators
The estimated average economic costs and rev-
enues by boat size class are given in table 1. For
most inputs, financial costs were assumed equiva-
lent to economic costs. Imputed values of owner-
operator labor were derived from the equivalent
shares paid to employed skippers, Economic de-
preciation costs were estimated as the real loss in
capital value of the boat resulting from fishing over
a years. Full equity profits were estimated as the
difference between revenue and total economicCoglan and Pascoe Separating Resource Rents from Intra-marginal Rents 225
Table 1. Economic Performance Indicators by Size Class (5, Average per Boat, 1994-95)
Under 7 7-1o 10–12 12-20 20-30
Mean RSE Mean RSE Mean RSE Mean RSE Mean RSE
Revenue
Total running costs
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notes: a) Estimated by dividing full equity profit by capital value, No relative standard error was estimated.
costs, excluding interest and rental payments. Thus
the performance of boats can be compared irre-
spective of the level of equity held by the owner.
Rates of return to capital were derived by dividing
the profit at full equity by the capital value of the
boat. The expected rate of return (i.e. the opportu-
nity cost of capital) was assumed to be 10?4obased
on the rate of return achieved by a major UK fish-
ing company listed on the stock market, Full de-
tails of the economic valuation of the costs are
given in Pascoe, Robinson and CogIan (1997).
Boats under 10 metres in length had rates of
return that, on average, exceeded the expected rate
of return (table 1). In other words, capital invested
in this part of the fishery on average earned a
greater return for society than the next best alter-
native. Since the returns were greater than what
would be required to keep the fisher in the indus-
try, these boats were considered to be earning, on
average, positive economic profits. However, this
was more likely to be a function of the relatively
low capital value than relative efficiency in pro-
duction.
For boats within the 10 to 20 metre range, the
rate of return to capital was slightly higher than the
expected rate of return. However, given the pos-
sible margins of error surrounding the mean val-
ues, it can be concluded that there were no signifi-
cant economic profits being earned. In contrast, the
20–30 metre boats were making economic losses
on average since the estimated average rate of re-
turn was less than the expected rate of return.
Resource Rent or Intra-marginal Rent?
From the above results, it appears that there is
resource rent being earned by some sectors of the
fleet. However, this would only be the case if all
boats within each subgroup were homogeneous.
Further, differentials in economic profits between
size classes may be more an indication of intra-
marginal rent than resource rent since some size
classes may be more technically efficient than oth-
ers.
Within a year, differences in profitability would
be expected even within a size class. Many fishers
used several different gear types over the year, and
the different gear types over the year, and the dif-
ferent gear types caught a range of overlapping
species (but in different proportions). Hence, while
the costs of the boat in a given size class may be
relatively similar, the revenues would vary given
the gear used, the catch combination and the pre-
vailing prices at the time. While operators using
some gear types may earn greater profits than those226 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
using other gears in a given year, the ability of
fishers to change gear would ensure that any intra-
marginal rents accruing through gear use would be
dissipated rapidly, Hence, the existence of intra-
marginal rent is not due to the use of any particular
gear type, but the combination of all inputs (e.g.
boat size, engine power, gear and the skill of the
crew and skipper).
About 9% of fishers interviewed were earning
positive full equity profits but had rates of return
less than 10%. This implies that they were cover-
ing their own labor costs but were not covering the
opportunity cost of capital. A further 2070 of boats
had negative full equity profits and hence negative
rates of return to capital. This implies that they
were not covering the full opportunity cost of ei-
ther labor or capital. In total, 29’%oof boats had
rates of return less than the expected rate of return.
These were dMributed across all size classes (in-
cluding the most profitable size class on average),
indicating that the “average” boat is not represen-
tative of the marginal boat.
Given that there are a number of extra-marginal
boats (i.e., earning less than their opportunity cost
of capital) any above normal profits earned on av-
erage by the boats must be indicative of intra-
marginal rent rather than resource rent. Conse-
quently, the use of average rates of return in this
case are not indicative of resource rent in the fish-
ery.
Estimation of Resource Rent
These results can be reinforced by looklng at the
average and marginal cost curve for the fleet as a
whole. In order to derive the marginal and average
cost curves for the fleet, a total cost curve was first
estimated from the survey data. An industry cost
curve is generally derived by comparing different
levels of output with the cost of producing that
output, As the fleet operating in the Channel are
largely multi-purpose boats (i.e. use several gear
types over the year) and catch a range of different
species with each gear type, separating the fleet
into particular gear or species groups is not mean-
ingful. Instead, the fleet is considered to consist of
a set of heterogeneous firms using different com-
binations of inputs to produce different combina-
tions of a common set of outputs. These outputs
can be combined into a single measure of output
(e.g. revenue) using the prices of the different spe-
cies. Similarly, the different combinations of in-
puts can be aggregated into a single measure based
on their unit costs, the result being equivalent to
the total costs.
Table 2. Estimated Total Cost Curve for the
UK English Channel Fleet
Standard
Variable Coefficient error t-statistic
Revenue 0.7193 0.0119 60.329
Revenuez 1.9731 E-6 3.9258E-7 5,026
Revenue3 1.0071 E-4 3. I11OE-12 3.237
i?z = 0,99 F = 280348.7 No. obs = 77
Boats in the sample were sorted on the basis of
their profitability from highest to lowest. Points
along the total industry cost curve were estimated
by multiplying the total cost of each sample boat
by the total number of boats that sample boat rep-
resented in the fishery. Similarly, the total output
associated with the total cost of the boat “group”
(i.e. the boats represented by the sample boat) was
estimated by multiplying the revenue of each
sample boat by the number of boats it represented
in the fishery.
From these, a stepped total cost curve can be
derived from the cumulative total of the scaled
individual total costs of each boat (Heathfield and
Wibe 1987). The cumulative total costs were re-
gressed against the level of output (i.e. revenue). A
cubic functional form was chosen to ensure a qua-
dratic marginal and average cost curve. As the es-
timation technique is based on cumulative costs of
additional boats, zero output is produced at zero
cost (i.e. zero boats), Hence, a zero intercept is
appropriate. The results of the regression analysis
are presented in table 2, From the t-statistics, all
variables were significant at the 5Yo level or
greater. While the adjusted R2 was very high this is
an unreliable measure given the absence of an in-
tercept and the existence of multicollinearity be-
tween the independent variables.
The marginal cost curve was derived by differ-
entiating the total cost curve with respect to output,
while the average cost curve was estimated by di-
viding the total cost curve through by revenue (fig-
ure 5). Given revenue was the output measure, av-
erage revenue per unit of output was constant (i.e.
1) for all levels of output. Consequently, average
revenue also equaled marginal revenue,
Average (and marginal) revenue was above av-
erage costs but below the marginal cost at the es-
timated total level of output. Hence, the fishery as
a whole was making economic profits even though
a number of boats were making economic losses
(the shaded area above the average/marginal rev-
enue curve). Total economic profits were estimated
to be in the order of 51 .42m, the difference be-
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Figure 5. Average and Marginal Cost Curves for the Fishery.
at the observed level of effort. However, a large
proportion of the fleet were accruing intra-
marginal rent (the shaded area below the average
revenue curve). The level of intra-marginal rent,
given as the area between the average revenue and
the marginal cost curves below the point of inter-
section, was estimated (through integrating both
the marginal revenue and cost curves) to be in the
order of f7.47m. Hence, while economic profits
were positive in the fishery the level of resource
rent being generated was estimated to be in the
order of -~6.05m (i.e. negative resource rent was
being generated in the fishery).
Discussion and Conclusions
The importance of separating intra-marginal rents
and resource rent from total economic profits in the
fishery goes beyond the assessment of the eco-
nomic performance of management. In most coun-
tries where fisheries management has been intro-
duced society as a whole has been identified as the
owners of the resource. Where the resource rent is
not collected in a managed fishery, the value of the
resource rent accrues to the fisher in the form of
economic (or above normal) profits. In this sense,
the resource rent being generated is being allocated
to one sector of society—the fishers. In some coun-
tries, consideration has been given to the introduc-
tion of a resource rent charge to ensure the return
of some of the rent to society as a whole (see for
example Hatcher and Pascoe 1998). Removing
more than the resource rent component (that is,
removing some of the intra-marginal rent) will re-
move the incentive for boat owners to move to
more efficient technologies (Anderson 1989,
Johnson 1995).
From the theoretical models presented earlier,
the existence of boats making a loss in a fishery is
sufficient to indicate the existence of negative re-
source rents in the fishery as a whole. The exis-
tence of extra-marginal boats in the fishery is
largely due to the non-malleability of the boat capi-
tal (Clark; Clarke and Munro 1979). In addition,
the introduction of new, more efficient boats into
the fleet over time may force previously marginal
or intra-marginal boats to become extra-marginal,
the so called fisheries meadmill (Whitmarsh 1998).
The marginal cost curve depicted in figure 5 rep-
resents the long-run marginal costs, and includes
the non-cash capital costs associated with the fish-
ing operation (e.g. depreciation and the normal re-
turn to capital). Provided returns exceed the vari-
able costs of fishing (including the annual fixed
costs), fishers will continue to operate in the fish-
ery in the short run as there is no-where else that
the capital can be employed.
An important assumption of the analysis is that
all boats are profit maximizers. Hence, a loss is the
result of an inability to earn profits due to exces-
sive effort in the fishery. However, other factors
may result in boats making losses. Small-scale part
time fishers may operate their boat more as a
hobby than a business, and may be prepared to
subsidize their fishing activity. Knowledge of the228 October 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
individuals in the survey will allow assessments of
the extent of such non-profit maximizing behavior,
so the analysis may be modified to exclude these
boats if necessary. In addition, some boat owners
may incur problems that result in an otherwise
profitable boat making a loss (e.g. illness). Again,
knowledge of these problems obtained during the
survey would enable the analyst to decide if the
boat is to be included in the analysis for the pur-
poses of assessing the components of economic
profits.
When using survey data to estimate changes in
rent between years, account also needs to be taken
of changes in prices and costs. Profitability may
increase in the fishery due to an exogenous in-
crease in prices (due, say, to a shift in consumer
preferences to seafood) or a reduction in costs (e.g.
reduced fuel costs). Unsustainable resource rents
may also be generated in the short term through
natural fluctuations in stock abundance resulting in
higher than average revenue per unit of effort. The
resultant increase in profitability will only be a
quasi rent rather than resource rent if the price, cost
or stock changes are only temporary. In contrast, if
the price increase was permanent, then the value of
the fish stocks would expect to increase in much
the same way that the value of agricultural land
would increase with rising farm prices. Hence, the
rent accruing to the stock would also increase and
the higher profits would be resource rent. How-
ever, these rents are likely to be dissipated through
increased fishing effort unless effective manage-
ment measures can be implemented to prevent this.
The above analysis has focused on identifying
the level of resource rent in heterogeneous fisher-
ies. This will become an increasingly important
requirement for the assessment of the economic
performance of fisheries management. The intro-
duction of policies such as a landing levy to extract
resource rent will require the policy maker to iden-
tify the contribution of each species in the genera-
tion of the rent. Identifying the source of any re-
source rent in a multi-species multi-gear fishery
will provide an additional challenge to fisheries
managers. While the existence and magnitude of
resource rent may be determined through eco-
nomic surveys, the contribution of the various spe-
cies or gear types to rent generation will require
additional bioeconomic modeling to ascertain,
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